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THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON 
AMERICAN LA w. By Robert Jerome Glennon. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press. 1985. Pp. 252. $24.95. 
In the first half of this century, Jerome Frank achieved prominence 
as a corporate attorney, a legal realist, a New Deal administrator, and 
finally as a federal appellate court judge. A study of Frank's career 
does more than testify to the man's extraordinary breadth of interest, 
energy, and ability; it serves as a pane through which one may witness 
the enormous changes in law and legal theory from 1930 to 1957. In 
The Iconoclast as Reformer: Jerome Frank's Impact on American 
Law, Professor Robert Glennon 1 traces Frank's career and attempts to 
evaluate Frank's influence in these areas. The result is an interesting 
and valuable work for those curious about Frank, but one that is only 
mildly successful in meeting its ambitious goal. 
Frank is perhaps best remembered as a vocal proponent of legal 
realism. In 1930, publication of Law and the Modern Mind propelled 
Frank, then a Wall Street attorney, into the forefront of the realist 
movement. This seminal work, written in a lucid and engaging style 
and drawing heavily upon psychology, traced the origins and conse-
I. Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B. 1966; J.D. 1969, Boston Col· 
lege; M.A. 1972; Ph.D. 1981, Brandeis University. 
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quences of the myth oflegal certainty, "substituted American pragma-
tism for Hegelian philosophy," and called upon legal thinkers to 
confess and reject "the bugaboo of certainty in the law."2 From the 
time of Modern Mind's publication until Frank's death in 1957, he 
produced a steady stream of books and articles on issues of law, poli-
tics, government, and philosophy, all of which displayed their author's 
excitement and originality.3 
In 1932, Frank left Wall Street ahd, with Felix Frankfurter's aid, 
moved to Washington as General Counsel to the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration. There, Frank assembled a talented legal staff, 
including young attorneys Abe Fortas, Alger Hiss, and Adlai Steven-
son, and during the course of the decade immersed himself in legal and 
political debate. In 1937, Frank joined his friend William<). Douglas 
on the Securities and Exchange Commission, and two years later suc-
ceeded Douglas as chairman.4 In 1941, Frank's tenure in Washington 
ended; he returned to New York, and from 1941 to 1957 legal realist 
Frank sat as judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. Frank's tenure as a jurist is Glennon's principal focus. 
The Iconoclast as Reformer is composed of six parts, each approxi-
2. Douglas, Jerome N. Frank, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 6 (1957). 
3. In one article, Frank even turned literary critic and challenged the prose of Cardozo, 
concluding that the late Justice wrote in an alien, worked-over style more befitting the eighteenth 
century than the twentieth. In an atypical display of reserve, Frank published the essay under 
the pseudonym Anom Y. Mous. See Mous, The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. 
L. REV. 625 (1943). 
Professor Philip Kurland, once a clerk for Judge Frank, recalls: 
I entered the Judge's chambers for the interview with all the smug self-assurance which the 
editorship of a leading law review and the certainty of a future job could afford. He invited 
me to sit down and "say something ... anything." I picked up the guantlet and brashly told 
him that his article on Cardozo's style was 1) in poor taste because it was anonymous, and 
2) displayed bad judgment because Cardozo's writing was pellucid and certainly better un-
derstood by students and lawyers than the cryptics of Holmes or the jargon of the psycholo-
gists whom the Judge quoted so freely. After an hour and a half of rather volatile and 
occasionally heated argument, I was asked how soon I could report for work. I 
Kurland, Jerome N. Frank: Some Reflections and Recollections of a Law Clerk, 24 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 661, 662 (1957) (footnote omitted; ellipsis in original). 
4. In a moving essay published to mark Frank's death, Justice Douglas recalled their first 
meeting: 
My first memory of Judge Frank goes back to the fall of 1934, when I went to Washing-
ton, D.C., to head up a new bureau or division in the recently created Securities and Ex-
change Commission. I was anxious to assemble a good staff, and the man I wanted to head 
it was Abe Fortas, who worked for Jerome Frank, then general counsel to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration. 
I asked for an appointment with Mr. Frank, and when I saw him in his office, he was 
most antagonistic. He figuratively tore me limb from limb. I realized as he talked that he 
had no animus toward me, but only a zealous protective attitude toward his staff. They 
were friends in whom he had a great emotional investment. So, I exploited that weakness by 
asking him, "Why do you stand in the way of your junior's professional advancement?" His 
attitude completely changed. He melted and at once became gentle and soft-spoken. And 
before I left, he was eager to help me find the best staff possible. 
Soon, I became a member of that small group toward whom Jerry Frank had a fatherly, 
protective attitude. 
Douglas, supra note 2, at I. 
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mately 30 pages long. The first is an overview of Frank's life; the sec-
ond concentrates on Frank as author and legal realist; the third 
examines Frank's participation in Roosevelt's New Deal; and the final 
three chapters focus on Frank's work as a federal appellate court 
judge. 
Chapter Four ("On Barking Up Trees") is the most interesting and 
successful of the final three chapters. It addresses Frank's efforts, 
while respecting the subordinate role of the Court of Appeals, to 
"urg[e], persuad[e], coax ... and cajol[e] the [Supreme] Court to move 
in desired directions" (p. 106). Frank pursued these efforts, in part, by 
writing candid opinions discussing the failings and inconsistencies of 
governing precedent. The most colorful example is drawn from In re 
Luma Camera Service, 5 in which Frank, while applying Second Cir-
cuit precedent, implored the Supreme Court to reverse: 
Although we know that Maggio cannot comply with the order, we 
must keep a straight face and pretend that he can, and thus affirm orders 
which first direct Maggio "to do an impossibility, and then punish him 
for refusal to perform it." Our own precedents keep us from abandoning 
that pretense which, in this case, may well lead to inhumane treatment of 
Maggio .... 
To eliminate the unfortunate results of the unreasonable fiction we 
have adopted, it will be necessary for the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari and then to wipe out our more recent precedents. 6 
The Supreme Court heard Frank's plea and vacated the judgment. 7 
Frank also sought to exert influence in letters addressed directly to 
his friends on the Court, usually to speak of general concerns, but oc-
casionally to request action in specific cases. Glennon's discussion of 
such efforts provides some of the book's most interesting reading.1 
Chapter Five ("Legal Realism on the Bench") follows with a dis-
appointing examination of "legal realism's" effect on Frank's judicial 
behavior. Glennon explores realism's influence by chronicling a series 
of cases on a variety of subjects to demonstrate Frank's proclivity for 
"doing justice" (p. 132). Yet sometimes Frank did not "do justice" -
as when, according to Glennon, Frank turned a blind eye to the injus-
tices of the Cold War.8 But if these cases suggest a tension between 
justice and Frank's judicial restraint, the reason for Frank's restraint is 
not established. The reader is left with a catalogue of case holdings 
5. 157 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1946), vacated and remanded sub nom. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 
(1948). 
6. 157 F.2d at 955, quoted at p. 108. 
7. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948). 
8. Glennon notes in particular United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950), ajfd., 
343 U.S. 1 (1952); and United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 
838 (1952), in which Frank affirmed rulings below that, Glennon says, were improperly influ-
enced by Cold War animus against the defendants. 
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and the not very interesting conclusion that sometimes Frank did jus-
tice and sometimes he did not. 
On the whole, Chapter Five's discussion rarely signals legal real-
ism at play. Given realism's interest in the language of judicial opin-
ions, it may have been more profitable to study the terms of Frank's 
opinions rather than their holdings. A law clerk for Judge Frank testi-
fied that the judge "was firmly wedded ... to the view that a judge in 
his decisions is under obligation to lay bare the fullness of his thought 
as far as he can himself understand it - the complex of his biases, his 
predispositions, his intellectual premises, his social views, his eco-
nomic predilections."9 If Frank was true to this view, it would have 
been fun to have seen an example. Then we, perhaps, could see the 
"modem mind" of Judge Jerome Frank. 
Chapter Six ("The Influence of a Circuit Judge in Influencing Con-
stitutional Law") picks up from Chapter Four, but is less successful. 
It sets out to examine Judge Frank's success at influencing the work of 
the Supreme Court, and his impact on the course of American law 
generally. As Glennon notes, however, such an inquiry is plagued by 
problems of analysis and quantification. His study is a case in point. 
Glennon first tries to measure Frank's influence by examining such 
things as the frequency with which Judge Frank was affirmed by the 
Court or mentioned in its opinions. 10 The figures are interesting, but 
fall closer to trivia than to proof. i 
Glennon concludes the chapter with an evaluative study of approx-
imately a dozen Frank opinions that, he says, shaped the course of 
American law by "contribut[ing] to a climate of [judicial] opinion" (p. 
179). Among these are Frank's famous concurrence in United States 
v. Roth, 11 his dissents in Chrestensen v. Valentine 12 and United States 
v. Grunewald, 13 and his opinion in Associated Industries v. Ickes. 14 
More broadly, Glennon notes the similarities between Frank's views 
and the judicial views prevailing in the 1960s, particularly with regard 
to judicial protection of civil liberties. But similarities are all that 
9. Davis, Jerome Frank - Portrait of a Personality, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 627, 628 (1957). 
10. The most interesting data are lifted from a study published in Marvin Schick's Learned 
Hand's Court, and suggest that Frank's participation in a case increased its chance of Supreme 
Court review, and that, upon review, the Court supported Frank more often than his brethren. 
More careful analysis of the figures and additional data would have been valuable, but are not 
provided. 
11. 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956), affd., 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Thurman Arnold, writing 
at Frank's death, wrote in reference to Roth: "Although a majority of the Supreme Court did 
not follow Judge Frank, his opinion was at least provocative enough to induce the Supreme 
Court to grant certiorari on an issue which the lower court had considered to be settled. There 
are few opinions like it - indeed, there are no opinions like it, in American case law. Arnold, 
Judge Jerome Frank, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 641 (1957). 
12. 122 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1941), revd., 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
13. 233 F.2d 556, 571 (2d Cir. 1956), revd. and remanded, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 
14. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (per curiam). 
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Glennon can show. Unable to demonstrate a causal relationship be-
tween Frank's opinions and the course of American law, the simple 
conclusion that Frank was ahead of his time is not enough to carry the 
chapter. The chapter's fault is its focus. Having admitted the difficul-
ties of his task, Glennon should have redirected his inquiry. If his 
interest was in evaluating Frank's major opinions, he should have been 
content to acknowledge and do just that. 
Chapters Four through Six are often interesting, but they fail to 
develop a coherent vision of Judge Frank's life on the bench. By or-
ganizing the chapters topically and isolating the issues in each, Glen-
non attempts to structure the book so that each chapter stands on its 
own. Unfortunately, the separateness of each chapter requires an un-
desirable degree of redundancy from one chapter to the next and 
makes The Iconoclast as Reformer read like a collection of essays, 
written separately and combined without editing. 
Taken separately, as it seems the author would have us do, the 
"essays" meet with uneven success. All are plagued by superficial 
analysis. Chapter Two, for instance, is devoted principally to an unil-
luminating discussion of Frank's Law and the Modern Mind, and its 
reception in legal literary circles. But Chapter Three, discussing 
Frank's participation in the New Deal, and Chapter Four, discussing 
his attempts to influence the Supreme Court, both of which rely more 
heavily on historical account, are much more successful, and are very 
interesting indeed. The writing throughout is competent, but does not 
share the wit or felicity of expression that characterized Frank's own 
works. 
By attempting to gauge the influence of a secondary figure in 
American law, Professor Glennon undertakes an interesting, but very 
difficult subject.' Traditional biography may have been a safer and 
more successful venture. 
Glennon writes that, initially, he set out to write a traditional biog-
raphy, "but eventually decided that [he] would find it more interest-
ing, as would readers, to focus on [Frank's] significance and on key 
questions posed by his career" (p. 10). Among those key questions, 
Glennon lists the impact of Frank's legal realism, how a legal realist 
can take legal doctrine seriously as a judge, how Frank could remain 
silent to the injustices of the Cold War, and to what extent Frank 
influenced the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the book does not pro-
vide persuasive answers to these questions. To the extent that The 
Iconoclast as Reformer tries to provide them, Glennon should have 
prefaced his book with the same warning with which Jerome Frank 
opened one of his own: "What follows consists of a series of guesses 
most of which are based on highly doubtful evidence - so doubtful 
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that the reader is warned to take little of this book very seriously."15 
- Matthew W. Frank 
15. J. FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 23-24 (1945). Glennon quotes this passage without 
citation (p. 10), and implies that Frank meant to caution his own readers. In fact, Judge Frank 
suggested that this warning was appropriate for works of history, not for his own. 
For a generally more favorable review of The Iconoclast as Reformer, see Tushnet, Book 
Review, 3 LAW & Hlsr. REV. 449 (1985). 
